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Ugly Criminals 
 
       “I am too ugly to get a job” 
A Miami man’s statement in 2003 as to why he committed robberies. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
It has been shown that beauty is positively related to earnings in the labor market 
(Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and Hamermesh 1998, Harper 2000, Hamermesh, 
Meng and Zhang 2002).  It has also been shown that better-looking people sort 
themselves into occupations, and sectors within occupations, where an earnings premium 
exists on beauty (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and Hamermesh 1998).   Persico, 
Postlewaite and Silverman (2004) demonstrate that taller workers receive a wage 
premium, which can be traced back to their height in high school, and that this effect is 
due to the impact of height on participation in high school sports and clubs.  Along the 
same lines, Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) show that leadership skills in high school 
generate positive wage effects later in life. 
 These are important and provocative findings regarding the development of a 
more complete understanding of wage determination, because they underline the 
significance of non-cognitive factors in determining worker rewards, and also because 
they point to non-traditional human capital components (e.g. skills acquired through 
socialization in high school) that are evidently valued in the labor market.   
These findings give rise to an interesting hypothesis regarding workers’ response 
to labor market incentives.   If beauty commands a positive earnings premium in the legal 
labor market, and if criminal activity is a labor market choice of rational agents where the 
decision to engage in crime is made by comparing the financial rewards from crime to 
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those obtained from legal work1, then it is expected that less attractive people sort 
themselves into the criminal sector.   
In this paper, we provide evidence regarding the impact of beauty on the extent of 
criminal activity of individuals.  We find that unattractive individuals commit more crime 
in comparison to average-looking ones, and very attractive individuals commit less crime 
in comparison to those who are average-looking.  This relationship holds for a number of 
self-reported criminal activity measures.   Beauty also impacts individuals’ interaction 
with the criminal justice system.  The results reveal that, conditional on criminal 
involvement, attractive females are less likely to get detained.    
Consistent with previous research (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and 
Hamermesh 1998), we find that in our data set beauty is positively related to wages.   We 
also show that beauty is positively related to the scores received on an adult achievement 
test, which suggests that being an unattractive student in high school may have hindered 
human capital development -- possibly through teacher and peer interactions.   We 
provide evidence supporting this hypothesis in models where the extent of pre-labor 
market beauty (beauty in high school) explains adult crime, controlling for adult beauty 
and an extensive array of background characteristics.  This result is consistent with 
empirical evidence reported by Figlio (2005) who shows that teachers in a Florida school 
district have lower expectations of children2 who have names that are associated with low 
socio-economic status.  Our results are also consistent with recent experimental evidence 
provided by Mobius and Rosenblat (2005) who find that physically attractive individuals 
                                                 
1 Individuals also take into account the probabilities of apprehension and conviction, and the 
severity of punishment (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973, Block and Heineke 1975, Mocan, Billups 
and Overland 2005). 
2 More specifically, teachers treat children differently in terms of referrals to gifted programs and 
promotion to the next grade. 
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have better communication skills, which are translated into higher wages.   Mobius and 
Rosenblat (2005) cite Hatfield and Sprecher (1986) to suggest that preferential treatment 
of better-looking kids by teachers generates confidence and social skills in these kids 
which lead to better communication skills and higher wages.   
Given the result that high school beauty is related to criminal involvement in post-
high school years (controlling for beauty in post-high school years), we investigate 
whether this result emerges because beauty in high school is related to aspects of human 
capital formation in high school.  Our analysis shows that high school beauty is indeed 
correlated with variables gauging high school experience of students, such as grade point 
average, problems with teachers and suspension from high school. 
 Taken together, our results suggest two mechanisms through which beauty affects 
crime.  First, a labor market reward to beauty motivates young adults (ages 18-26) to sort 
themselves on the margin such that unattractive ones find it more advantageous to engage 
in crime.  Second, beauty in high school has a separate, independent effect on crime.  
Here, the pathway is from being unattractive in high school to undesirable high school 
experience and diminished human capital formation in high school.  This second 
mechanism through which beauty affects crime is more pronounced for females.  
It is of course critically important to establish causal effects from beauty to 
criminality, and therefore to investigate whether beauty is acting as a proxy for some 
unobserved background characteristic.  Various analyses in the paper indicate that this is 
not the case.   In Section 2, we provide the basic analytical framework.  Section 3 
describes the data, and Section 4 presents the results and extensions.  Section 5 is the 
conclusion. 
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II. Analytical Framework and Empirical Implementation 
Standard economic models of crime suggest that individuals engage in crime  
based on a comparison of the expected utility from criminal activity to the utility 
associated with legal work.  Specifically, let the expected utility of the individual in the 
criminal sector be 
E[U(W)]= (1-p) U(Wcr)+pU(Wa),       (1) 
where Wcr is the earning in the criminal sector when criminal activity is successful, Wa 
stands for the earnings if criminal activity is unsuccessful (i.e. the person is 
apprehended), p stands for the probability of apprehension, U represents utility, and E is 
the expectations operator.  Wa<Wcr because there are monetary losses associated with 
apprehension and punishment, and psychic and reputational costs are monetized in Wa.  
The individual engages in crime if  
(1-p)U(Wcr)+pU(Wa) > U(Wl),        (2) 
where Wl represents earnings in the legal sector, which are determined as follows: 
     Wl = γB+βX.         (3)  
In Equation (3), X is a vector of standard human capital determinants of labor 
market earnings, and B stands for an indicator of beauty.  If γ>0, then beauty commands 
a premium in the labor market.   In that case, the right-hand side of the inequality in (2) is 
smaller for unattractive individuals, which makes them more likely to participate in the 
criminal sector in comparison to good-looking ones.   It is interesting to note that there is 
research which indicates that criminals who have their physical appearance surgically 
enhanced are less likely to return to prison (Lewison 1974).  
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Good looks may enhance utility in the criminal sector.  This can happen, for 
example, if beauty instills trust, which would increase the returns from crime.  In 
addition, the probability of apprehension, p, may be a function of beauty [p(B)], such 
that, good looks may reduce the probability of apprehension and conviction (dp(B)/dB<0) 
(Efran 1974, DeSantis and Kayson 1997).  In this case, good-looking people would have 
an advantage in both legal and criminal sectors, and the net impact of beauty on crime 
could be ambiguous.  However, for most types of crimes, the effect of being attractive on 
criminal earnings (Wcr) is likely to be small.3  
 If the beauty premium in the criminal sector is zero, or if it is smaller than the 
premium in the legal labor market, this would result in sorting of more attractive 
individuals into the labor market and less attractive ones into the criminal sector.   In 
addition, if some component of the beauty premium in the legal labor market results from 
differential treatment by employers, one would expect a higher concentration of 
unattractive individuals in the self-employment sector.4  To the extent that most criminals 
are self-employed, this would motivate sorting of unattractive individuals into the 
criminal sector and attractive individuals into the legal labor market.5 Thus, the average 
level of beauty would be higher in the labor market in comparison to the criminal sector.    
It should be noted that sorting into different sectors based on attractiveness is 
likely to be incomplete, i.e., both attractive and unattractive individuals are likely to be 
found in both sectors (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).  For example, unattractive 
                                                 
3 One can especially argue that in some white-collar crimes, such as financial fraud, attractiveness may be 
an advantage by helping the criminals gain trust of their victims as discussed above.  However, fraud is not 
among the crime types analyzed in this paper. 
4 In the context of the choice between criminal sector and labor market, customer discrimination would 
have the same effect as the employer discrimination.  
5 For a more detailed discussion on the process of sorting into different sectors, see Biddle and Hamermesh 
(1998). 
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individuals who are endowed with a relatively high level of human capital may choose to 
participate in the legal labor market although attractiveness is rewarded and/or 
unattractiveness is penalized in that market.  Likewise, attractive individuals who are 
endowed with a relatively low level of human capital may choose the criminal sector 
even though attractiveness brings little in the criminal sector compared to the labor 
market.    
 Empirical crime supply functions take the following form (Grogger 1998, Levitt 
1998, Corman and Mocan 2000, Mocan and Rees 2005): 
 CRi = f (Xi, A, Wl, Ki),       (4) 
where CRi stands for a measure of the extent of the criminal activity of the ith individual 
when she/he is a young adult, Xi represents the characteristics of the person such as age, 
gender, race, ethnicity and religious beliefs.  A stands for deterrence variables such as the 
arrest rate and the size of the police force, and Wl represents the extent of legal labor 
market opportunities available to the individual, such as the pertinent wage rate.  Ki 
stands for a vector of family and contextual variables that may influence criminal 
participation.   Replacing Wl in (4) by its determinants, including beauty, depicted in (3) 
gives 
  CRi = g (Xi, A, Bi, Ki),       (5) 
We estimate variations of equation (5) to investigate the impact of beauty on criminal 
activity. 
To test if the previously detected wage-beauty relationship holds in our data set, 
we estimate wage equations similar to Hamermesh and Biddle (1994).  In addition, we 
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estimate models to investigate if beauty is related to a measure of human capital (adult 
vocabulary test score).     
As described above, beauty may have an impact on the treatment provided by 
criminal justice system (Efran 1974, Desantis and Kayson 1997).  Specifically, attractive 
individuals may receive preferential and more lenient treatment from the judicial system, 
which would reduce their probability of apprehension.  This would imply an increase in 
expected utility from the criminal sector, which all else the same, would make the 
individual more likely to engage in crime.   To investigate the presence of such an effect 
we estimate models where the probabilities of being detained, arrested, or convicted are 
analyzed as a function of the extent of beauty of the individual.  
It is important to recognize that unattractive individuals might experience 
unfavorable treatment during the pre-labor market period of their lives, which may cause 
them to be endowed with lower levels of human capital when they reach adulthood.  For 
example, physically attractive individuals may be liked better by their peers, teachers, 
and even possibly their parents, compared to their unattractive peers (Cialdini 1984, 
Galluci and Meyer 1984, Feingold 1992).  If these attitudes influence human capital 
acquisition as suggested by recent research in economics (Figlio 2005; Mobius and 
Rosenblat 2005), they reinforce sorting of unattractive individuals into the criminal 
sector. 
If the extent of beauty in high school impacts the formation of human capital 
(because beauty influences teacher attitudes and socialization experiences), then high 
school (i.e. pre-labor market) beauty should have a separate impact on adult crime.  To 
test this hypothesis, we estimate models such as  
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CRi = h (Xi, A, Bi, Bihs, Ki),       (6) 
where  Bihs represents the level of beauty of the individual, measured in high school.  If 
the beauty of the person in high school impacts his/her human capital and skill 
acquisition, which in turn impacts criminal involvement, then  Bihs is expected to have a 
direct positive impact on CRi, controlling for current beauty (Bi) in Equation (6).6  
Furthermore, if the impact of high school beauty on crime works indeed through this 
channel, then controlling for variables that aim to gauge high school learning experience, 
(e.g. grade point average, whether the students has problems with teachers, and whether 
he/she was suspended from school), would diminish the effect of high school beauty 
(Bihs) on crime. 
 
III. Data 
The data used in the analyses are drawn from the three waves of the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).7  The first wave of Add Health 
                                                 
6  It can also be the case that these peer and teacher effects may motivate the physically 
unattractive student to devote more time studying. In this case, unattractiveness would be 
positively correlated with human capital formation. 
7 The Add Health project is a program project designed by J. Richard Udry (PI) and Peter 
Bearman, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development to the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, with cooperative funding participation by the National Cancer Institute; the National 
Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; the National Institute on Deafness and Other 
Communication Disorders; the National Institute on Drug Abuse; the National Institute of 
General Medical Sciences; the National Institute of Mental Health; the National Institute of 
Nursing Research; the Office of AIDS Research, NIH; the Office of Behavior and Social Science 
Research, NIH; the Office of the Director, NIH; the Office of Research on Women's Health, NIH; 
the Office of Population Affairs, DHHS; the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, DHHS; the Office of Minority Health, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, DHHS; the Office of Minority Health, Office of Public Health and 
Science, DHHS; the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, DHHS; and 
the National Science Foundation.  Persons interested in obtaining data files from The National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health should contact Add Health Project, Carolina Population 
Center, 123 West Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (email: addhealth@unc.edu). 
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was administered between September 1994 and April 1995 to 20,745 nationally 
representative set of adolescents in grades 7 through 12.  An in-school questionnaire was 
given to every student who attended one of the sampled 132 U.S. schools.  A random 
sample of approximately 200 adolescents from each high school/feeder school pair was 
selected for in-home interviews.  The adolescents are interviewed for the second time in 
1996 for Wave II, and for the third time between August 2001 and April 2002 for Wave 
III.  We employ data from Wave III, where the individuals are in the age range of 18 to 
26.  The number of individuals interviewed in Wave III is 15,197.   In some models we 
also employ data from Waves I and II. 
The respondents were asked whether they had committed any of the following 
acts in the 12 months prior to the interview date:  robbery, burglary, assault, selling 
drugs, damaging property, and theft.  Survey administrators took several steps to 
maintain data security and to minimize the potential for interviewer or parental influence.  
First, respondents were not provided with any printed questionnaires.  Rather, all data 
were recorded on laptop computers.  Second, the respondents listened to pre-recorded 
questions through earphones for sensitive topics such as delinquent behavior.  They then 
entered their answers directly on the laptops.8  
At the end of each interview, the interviewer filled out a short survey marking 
his/her opinions on several characteristics of the respondent.  To gauge the level of 
beauty of the respondents, the interviewers were asked the following question: “How 
physically attractive is the respondent?”  Possible answers include: 1) very unattractive  
2) unattractive  3) about average  4) attractive  5) very attractive.  Table 1 shows the 
                                                 
8  For less sensitive questions, the interviewer read the questions aloud, and entered the 
respondent’s answers. 
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distribution of beauty ratings among respondents in the third wave when the respondents 
are in the age range of 18-26.  Among both males and females, about 7 percent of 
respondents were rated as being either very unattractive or unattractive by the 
interviewers.  Roughly half of the full sample is rated as either attractive or very 
attractive.  The proportion rated as attractive or very attractive is higher for females than 
males.  This is consistent with the samples from other studies (e.g. Hamermesh and 
Biddle 1994).   The rating of females seems to be more dispersed about the average 
category.  This is also common in other studies and is consistent with the socio-
psychological literature which suggests that women’s appearances generate stronger 
reactions (both negative and positive) than men’s (Hatfield and Sprecher 1986).  The 
ratings in our sample are somewhat more skewed toward being more beautiful than both 
the Canadian and the U.S. samples used in Hamermesh and Biddle (1994).   However, 
when the QES sample used by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) is adjusted for age, it 
produces a very similar beauty distribution.9 
Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, if beholders come from different 
cultures and from different points in time.  As described in detail by Hamermesh and 
Biddle (1994), there is tremendous consistency in the standard of beauty within a culture 
in a given time period.  Nevertheless, in the paper we address the possibility of different 
evaluators having different standards of attractiveness.   
The beauty question was also asked in the first two waves of the Add Health 
survey.  Evaluations were provided by different interviewers.   Eighty-five percent of the 
                                                 
9  In the QES sample used by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), of all individuals  (ages 18-64), 32 % were in 
top two beauty categories, and 14% were in bottom two.  Among 18-26 year olds (which is the age group 
of this paper), the rates were 45%, and 10%, respectively.  We thank Dan Hamermesh for providing this 
information. 
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sample was assigned either the same exact rating (on a scale from 1 to 5) in at least two 
of the three surveys.  Seventy-five percent of the individuals in the sample were either 
assigned the same rating in each of the three waves by different interviewers, or were 
given the same rating in any of the 2 of the 3 waves and were off by one in the other 
wave.  This is a high degree of consistency across evaluators and time periods, especially 
because six years had lapsed between the first wave and the third wave, and also because 
the individuals transitioned from childhood to adulthood during this time period. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the data obtained from the third wave.  
The variables that measure the extent of criminal activity are listed in the top section of 
the table.  The top three variables contain information about the behavior of the 
individual as well as the behavior of the criminal justice system.  These are indicators for 
whether the individual was ever arrested, convicted, or detained in the past.  Other 
indicators of criminal activity are self-reported involvement in robbery, burglary, assault, 
selling drugs, theft and damaging property.   We also construct an aggregate non-drug 
crime indicator to gauge whether the individual committed theft, burglary, robbery, 
assault or damaged property in the past 12 months. 
 A natural way to construct variables to represent beauty would be to choose a 
three-category distinction: above average beauty (categories 4 and 5), average (category 
3), and below average (categories 1 and 2).  However, this classification would result in 
about half of our sample lumped into the above average category.  Instead, we categorize 
individuals into the following three groups:  Very Attractive, which captures the 
individuals who received the highest rating of 5; Unattractive, which includes those who 
received a rating of 1 or 2; and the middle (control group) which consists of those who 
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have received a rating of 3 (about average) or 4 (attractive).  To investigate the sensitivity 
of our results to the manner in which beauty is measured, we also present results from a 
four-way classification, which divides individuals into the following groups: very 
attractive (category 5), attractive (category 4), and below average (categories 1 and 2).  
Personal characteristics of the individual are age, race and ethnicity, non-wage 
income, self-reported health status, whether he/she was born in the United States, birth 
weight, and religious affiliation.10  These variables attempt to control for attributes of the 
individuals that may influence their propensity toward criminal behavior.   We also 
control for a rich set of socio-economic background variables, which include family and 
parent attributes that are also potential determinants of the behavior of the individual, and 
may be correlated with beauty.  Specifically, we control for such characteristics as the 
mother’s education, whether the family was on welfare, family income, whether the 
father is biological or stepfather, the age of the mother at birth, whether the father was in 
jail, and birth weight.  These variables are measured in Wave I, when the individual was 
in high school.  We retained individuals with missing data on control variables by 
creating categories for missing information. 
The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2.  
Eleven percent of the sample indicated that they had been arrested at least once and about 
6 percent indicated that they had been convicted of a crime in a juvenile or adult court. A 
little less than 20 percent of the sample was ever questioned or detained by the police for 
suspicious activities.  Those who committed burglary or robbery are about 2 percent 
                                                 
10  Currie and Moretti (2005) document strong inter-generational correlations in birth weight, and 
show that birth weight is an indicator of future income.  Similarly, Black, Devereux and Salvanes 
(2005) show that within-twin estimates reveal long-run effects of birth weight on outcomes such 
as earnings and education.  Thus, we include the birth weight of the individual to account for a 
measure of health at birth, which may be correlated with future socio-economic status. 
      13 
 
each.  About nine percent indicated they had damaged property and 8 percent said they 
had assaulted somebody.  The proportion that committed theft is 3.3 percent, and the 
proportion that sold illicit drugs is 7.4 percent.  More than 17 percent of our sample 
indicated that they had committed either burglary, theft, robbery, assault, or damaged 
property during the past 12 months.  Mocan and Tekin (2006, 2005) show that rates of 
risky behaviors reported in Add Health, such as crime and illicit drug use are comparable 
to those in other national sources, and Mocan and Rees (2005) demonstrate that the 
extent of juvenile crime calculated from Add Health is similar to those obtained from 
other sources.  The means for other covariates are presented at the bottom panel of Table 
2 and are also largely consistent with those usually found in other studies. 
 
IV. Results 
Table 3 presents the results pertaining to the relationship between attractiveness 
and criminal behavior for females and males separately.  The reported coefficients are 
obtained from linear probability models.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Estimation of logit models generated similar results.  The table displays the results from 
three specifications.  Model (I) includes no control variables.  Model (II) includes 
personal characteristics of the individual in addition to the level of beauty, which are age, 
race, Hispanic ethnicity, birthweight, nonwage income, health status, religious affiliation, 
and whether the person was born in the U.S.   Model (III) contains the same explanatory 
variables as Model (II), but it also includes family socio-economic background 
characteristics which are family income when the individual was in high school, whether 
parents were receiving welfare, mother’s education, whether the father was biological, 
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step father, or absent, mother’s age at birth, and whether father was ever jailed.  In each 
model only the coefficients of two beauty dummies (Very Attractive and Unattractive) 
are reported.  The models do not include deterrence variables such as the arrest rates or 
the size of the police force because we have no information on the geographic location of 
the individuals in the data.  However, the extent of the beauty of the individual and the 
level of deterrence in his/her locality should be uncorrelated.  Therefore, the omission of 
deterrence variables does not bias the estimated coefficients of beauty variables. 
One concern is that each interviewer may have a different standard for beauty.  To 
the extent that these differing standards are correlated with the respondents’ criminal 
behavior, our estimates may be biased.  To guard against this potential problem, models 
II and III are estimated using interviewer-specific fixed effects in addition to the set of 
controls described above.   
A number of aspects of Table 3 are noteworthy.   First, the estimated coefficients 
are of the expected sign in overwhelming majority of the cases.   For example, in case of  
females, the coefficient of Very Attractive is negative in 6 of 7 crime measures.   
Similarly, the coefficient of Unattractive is positive in 6 of 7 cases.   For males, all of the 
coefficients are of expected signs in models with control variables.  Second, the estimated 
coefficients are stable across specifications.  Put differently, inclusion of personal 
characteristics (Model II) and personal and family characteristics (Model III) do not 
change the magnitude of the estimated beauty effects.  This indicates that our measure of 
beauty is uncorrelated with personal or family characteristics. 
 In case of females, beauty has a statistically significant impact on all crimes but 
theft and burglary.  Being a very attractive female reduces the propensity to damage 
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property by 1.1 percentage points, to commit non-drug crime (burglary, theft, robbery, 
assault, or property damage) by 2.5 percentage points, and the propensity to assault 
somebody by 2 percentage points in comparison to being of average attractiveness in the 
most comprehensive model (III).  The coefficient is not quite significant (p=0.11) in case 
of burglary.  Being an unattractive female increases the propensity for robbery by 1.5 
percentage points, the propensity to assault by 2.2 percentage points, and selling drugs by 
3 percentage points.   For males, we observe that the coefficients of Very Attractive are 
always negative in the most comprehensive model (Model III), and the coefficients of 
Unattractive are always positive once the models include interviewer fixed-effects, 
although the coefficients are estimated with less precision.  The finding that the effect of 
beauty is stronger for females is consistent with the results reported by Hamermesh and 
Biddle (1994), who show that unattractive females have lower labor force participation 
rates, and unattractive females marry badly.  Specifically, all else the same, the husbands 
of unattractive females have less education.  Thus, unattractive females likely face further 
income effects that force them towards criminal activity.  
Another interesting exercise is to consider the sorting behavior within criminality, 
i.e., by sub-occupation.  One can argue that there are certain sub-occupations, for 
example robbery or assault, where being unattractive can serve as an advantage by 
increasing the ability of the individual to instill terror on the victim, whereas being 
unattractive would have less of an impact for other crimes such as burglary, although one 
would still expect an effect of attractiveness on burglary because attractiveness has a 
positive effect on legal labor market returns.11  In Table 3 we see some evidence of 
sorting behavior within crime types for females.  Being an unattractive female increases 
                                                 
11 We would like to thank Dan Hamermesh for bringing this point to our attention. 
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the propensity for robbery and assault by more, both in terms of magnitude and 
significance, than it does for theft.  
An alternative method to categorize beauty is to use the four-way classification, 
as described earlier.  The results from this specification of attractiveness are presented in 
Table 4, and are consistent with those in Table 3.  As in Table 3, in overwhelming 
majority of the cases the coefficients are of expected sign.  An interesting finding in this 
table is that in a vast majority of the crime measures, the relative magnitude of the effects 
of Very Attractive and Attractive strengthens the evidence that attractive individuals sort 
themselves out of the criminal sector.  Specifically, the absolute value of the coefficients 
of Very Attractive are larger than those of Attractive, indicating that attractive individuals 
commit less crime in comparison to those with average attractiveness (the left-out 
category), and very attractive individuals commit less crime in comparison to attractive 
ones.  Consistent with Table 3, the effect of attractiveness on criminal behavior is found 
to be weaker for males, but the directions of the effects are mostly consistent with our 
predictions.   
Physical attractiveness of the young adult may be correlated with family income.  
For example, one can argue that individuals from low income families may have worse 
features such as bad teeth.  In our case, these concerns are minimized as inclusion of a 
host of family socio-economic characteristics does not influence the estimated 
coefficients, suggesting that beauty is not capturing family background.   We provide 
more evidence on robustness of the results and exogeneity of beauty in the extensions 
section below. 
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 Because the hypothesis of sorting to the criminal sector is based on expected 
monetary payoffs in labor and criminal markets, a natural question is why assaulting 
somebody and damaging property are influenced by beauty.  The answer seems to lie in 
the fact that individuals who commit assault or property damage tend to engage in other 
crimes as well.  Thus, assault and damaging property are highly correlated with other 
crimes.  For example, among those individuals who commit assault, the mean of robbery 
incident is 0.12, the mean of burglary is 0.08, the mean of theft is 0.10, and that of selling 
drugs is 0.22.  In contrast, the corresponding means among those who have not 
committed an assault are: 0.01, 0.01, 0.03, and 0.06, respectively.  The same is true for 
damaging property.  Among those who damaged property, the means of committing 
robbery, burglary, theft, and selling drugs are 0.11, 0.12, 0.18, and 0.25.  The 
corresponding means among those who have not damaged property are 0.01, 0.01, 0.02 
and 0.09, respectively. 
Beauty may also have an impact on the treatment provided by the criminal justice 
system.12   To investigate whether attractive individuals are more likely to receive 
favorable treatment from the criminal justice system, we analyze the link between 
attractiveness and three variables that reflect the individual’s own criminal behavior and 
the behavior of the criminal justice system.  These are: ever being arrested, detained or 
convicted.  We present these results in Table 5.   The first column of the upper panel 
shows that, conditional on having committed a crime, being a very attractive female is 
negatively and significantly associated with ever being detained.   The second column 
demonstrates that being a very attractive female has no impact on the probability of being 
                                                 
12 Argys and Mocan (2004) show that even for inmates on death row, personal attributes, such as 
race and gender, are influential in determining whether they receive lenient treatment. 
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arrested, conditional on being detained.  The same result is obtained when we control for  
criminal participation in column three.  Columns four and five show that conditional on 
being arrested, beauty has no impact on the probability of conviction.   Thus, the top 
panel of Table 5 demonstrates that being a very attractive female lowers the probability 
of being detained, but it has no impact on conditional arrest or conviction probabilities.   
This finding can be thought of as supportive evidence for beauty not being an indicator of 
personal or family socio-economic status.  This is because if beauty were to be positively 
correlated with socio-economic status, then it would be expected to have an impact on the 
probability of conviction and perhaps of arrest, through the ability to afford higher quality 
legal representation and defense.  For males, there is no real indication that attractiveness 
has an impact on the probability of being detained, arrested, or convicted. 
 
Alternative Specifications 
 As an alternative analysis, we used all three beauty ratings assigned to the 
individuals in the three waves of the survey, and added up these three ratings.  Thus, an 
individual’s total beauty rating after three evaluations can rage from 3 (being rated 1 in 
each case) to 15 (being rated 5 in each case).  We classified individuals into three 
categories: Very attractive (if total rating is greater than or equal to 14), Unattractive (if 
the total rating is less than or equal to 9) and Average (if total rating is between 10 and 
13).  
The results of this specification are reported in Table 6.  They are consistent with 
those reported in Table 3, but here beauty has no impact on robbery for females, and it 
has no impact on theft for males.  On the other hand, the coefficients of both Very 
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Attractive and Unattractive, which were not quite significant for males in Table 3, 
become statistically significant in this specification.  In Table 6, very attractive females 
are about 2 percentage points less likely to damage property, and 0.5 percentage points 
less likely to burglarize in comparison to average-looking ones.  Unattractive females are 
1.4 percentage points more likely to damage property, 1.8 percentage points more likely 
to assault somebody, and about 1 percentage point more likely to sell drugs, and 2.8 
percentage points more likely to commit non-drug crime.  In case of males, unattractive 
individuals are about 1 percentage point more likely to commit robbery, and 1.7 
percentage points more likely to sell drugs in comparison to average-looking males.  
Very attractive males are 4 percentage points less likely to sell drugs.  These magnitudes 
are very similar to those reported in Table 3, which were based on Wave III data. 13 
The results presented in Tables 3, 4 and 6 indicate that unattractive individuals are 
more likely to commit crimes, and attractive individuals are less likely to commit crimes 
in comparison to average-looking individuals.  The results are robust to a variety of 
specifications.  Beauty seems to be measured rather consistently as there is a high degree 
of agreement between beauty ratings provided for individuals by different evaluators over 
three evaluations, where the first and last one were six years apart.14  
                                                 
13 It is not feasible to analyze the impact of the change in beauty between high school and adult 
years on the change in crime between the same periods.   There are two reasons for this.  First, the 
ratings of beauty are highly correlated between time periods, thus first-differenced beauty ratings 
do not provide much information.  Second, although we can take the difference in criminal 
activity between adult and high school periods, conceptually they are not quite comparable 
because adults presumably make the crime-work decision as a labor market choice in Wave 
III, but the decision to engage in crime in high school may have been done in a different 
framework. 
 
14 Note that measurement error in a beauty variable would make it more difficult to obtain 
significant coefficients. 
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Extensions 
Robustness 
One legitimate concern is that each interviewer might have a different standard 
for beauty.  As Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) point out, these differences could be 
regarded as a source of measurement error, which would bias our estimates toward zero 
to the extent that interviewer standards are randomly correlated with the respondents' 
criminal propensities.   Including interviewer fixed effects as we do throughout the paper, 
accounts for this potential confounding.  It is also conceivable that male and female 
interviewers provided systematically different beauty ratings.   A great majority of our 
interviewers (about 80 percent) are female, and when we estimated our models restricting 
the sample to female interviewers only, the results remained essentially the same.15  A 
similar argument can be made for the differences in ratings between interviewers of 
different races.  More than 77 percent of the interviewers are white.  The results did not 
change when the models are re-estimated with white interviewers only.  We also 
restricted the sample to white respondents who are rated by white interviewers.  
Estimating the models using this sub-sample did not alter the results in a systematic way.   
Despite the reduction in the sample size, the signs of all estimated coefficients remained 
the same.  For females, although the impact of attractiveness on damaging property and 
robbery became insignificant, attractiveness became statistically significant in the 
burglary  regression.  For males, the coefficient of very attractive turned insignificant for 
robbery and theft, but it became significant in damage and burglary.   
                                                 
15  The distribution of ratings provided by female raters were as follows by order of category: 
2.01%, 4.90%, 44.72%, 36.55%, and 11.83%.  The ratings provided by male interviewers were 
distributed as: 1.61%, 5.73%, 50.25%, 33.33% and 9.07%. 
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 If less attractive individuals are more likely to engage in crime, and if these 
individuals are imprisoned quickly after high school, or if they drop out from the 
longitudinal survey for some other reason, our data set from Wave III (of young adults) 
will not include less attractive and more crime-prone individuals.   However, a 
comparison of the beauty ratings of those who were observed in Wave I, but not since 
(those who dropped out of the sample), with those who were observed in Wave III 
demonstrated that both the means and the distributions of the beauty ratings are similar 
between these two groups.  The same result is obtained by comparing those who were 
observed in Wave II, but not in Wave III, as well as those who were observed in wave I, 
but not in Wave II.  Thus, we find that attrition is independent of beauty.  
 Although the beauty question explicitly asks the interviewer to rate the “physical 
attractiveness” of the individual, it is conceivable that individuals with a “bad attitude” 
during the interview were assigned lower ratings on their physical attractiveness.  To 
control for such potential confounding, we added to the models a variable gauging the 
attractiveness of the personality.  This variable is based on the question “how attractive is 
the personality of the respondent?’ which was answered by the interviewer at the end of 
the interview.  We created dichotomous variables to indicate if the respondent’s 
personality was rated as unattractive (mean=0.023), or as very unattractive (mean=0.013) 
by the interviewer.  Adding these personality controls did not alter the results.  Similarly, 
based on the question “How attractive is the respondent’s grooming?” we created a 
dummy variable for unattractive grooming (mean=0.058).  Adding this grooming variable 
to the models did not change the results either.    
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Obese individuals are likely to receive lower attractiveness ratings.  Strictly 
speaking, obesity or body mass index (BMI) should not be controlled for in the 
regressions, because it is part of an individual’s “physical attractiveness.”  Controlling for 
BMI would imply that attractiveness is measured by facial beauty.16  Nevertheless, using 
the measured high and weight of the individual, we created the BMI for each individual, 
and added a dummy variable to the models to indicate if the respondent’s BMI is greater 
than or equal to 30, (the cutoff for obesity; mean=0.224).  Again, the results remain 
unchanged.  
 Finally, note that estimating the models using individuals who have non-missing 
beauty rating in all three waves (Table 6), and using a 4-way classification of beauty 
(Table 4) did not alter the results. 
 
  
Is it an Income Effect? 
The measure of beauty is unlikely to be effected by the extent of the criminal 
activity of the individual.  Although it can be argued that committing property crime 
would increase income, which would in turn allow the individual to enhance his/her 
attractiveness through the consumption of beauty products, Hamermesh and Biddle 
(1994) show that such reverse causality is not crucial even in the context of wages and 
beauty; so it should be even less important in case of crime and beauty.  Furthermore, in 
                                                 
16 This is clearly not the case in current popular culture, and the most recent evidence can be 
found in the TV show “Biggest Loser” on NBC, where 14 unattractive individuals –by their own 
declaration in some cases- were competing to lose weight.  Every single contestant had beautiful 
facial features, but they were unattractive because of their obesity.  Similarly, it was reported on 
NBC that when supermodel Tyra Banks wore a “fat suit” on the street, she faced laughter, stares 
and nasty comments  
(http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/BeautySecrets/story?id=1280787). 
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our case any such reverse causality would bias the result in the opposite direction 
detected in the paper. 
 Could beauty be picking up some other effect that is correlated with criminal 
activity?  For example, if interviewers consistently rated poorer individuals as 
unattractive, then beauty would be acting as a proxy for poverty.  Given that poverty is 
correlated with criminal activity, we might be picking up the impact of poverty on crime.  
Note that we control for a very large number of individual and socio-economic 
background variables, including personal unearned income, mother’s education, whether 
the individual’s family was on welfare, family income, whether the father was ever jailed, 
etc.   Also note that adding to Model III all the personal and family attributes (listed in 
Table 2) did not alter the results in comparison to those obtained from models that 
omitted them, indicating that unobserved factors are not influencing the relationship 
between beauty and crime.  
Although the models contain an exhaustive list of personal and family 
background characteristics (see Table 2), if interviewers consistently assigned higher 
beauty ratings to those individuals who live in high income, low crime neighborhoods 
and if these individuals have lower criminal propensities, beauty might be picking up this 
neighborhood effect.  To account for this possibility, we estimated the most 
comprehensive models with the addition of county-specific contextual variables.  These 
pertain to the county of residence when the individual was in high school.  These 
additional variables are the proportion of population living in rural area in the county of 
the individual in 1990, population density (number of persons per sq. km) in 1990,  
proportion black in the county in 1990, proportion Hispanic in the county in 1990, 
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median household income in the county in 1990, the unemployment rate in the county in 
1990, the total crime rate per 100,000 population in county in 1993, the proportion voting 
democratic in the1992 presidential election in the county, and proportion voting for Ross 
Perot in the 1992 presidential election in the county.   Estimating the models with these 
variables did not alter the results. Alternatively, we added to the models county dummies 
to control county-level unobservables, which did not change the results either. 
 
Wages and Beauty 
For the sorting mechanism to be effective, there should be a labor market 
premium to beauty as discussed in the introduction.  Although earlier papers have 
demonstrated this effect, it is important to investigate its existence in this data set as well.  
We estimated models where the logarithm of hourly wages of the individuals are 
regressed on the same large set of explanatory variables and the beauty dummy variables.  
The results obtained from the third wave, as well as from the sample of all three waves 
with non-missing beauty ratings revealed wage premiums for beauty similar to those 
reported earlier (e.g. Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Biddle and Hamermesh 1998).17 
 
Is there a human capital impact of beauty? 
The positive impact of beauty on wages reported earlier and also identified in 
these data may reflect some unobserved factor that may be correlated with beauty.  For 
example, it has been shown that good-looking people have higher test scores, and it has 
been hypothesized that this could be because they receive more attention at school (Bull 
and Rumsey 1988).  Also, attractive individuals are considered more trustworthy (Wilson 
                                                 
17  These results, which are not reported in the interest of space, are available upon request. 
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and Eckel 2005), and for young adolescents’ physical attractiveness is related to peer 
relations and academic performance (Lerner et al, 1990).  Interestingly, good looking 
people receive more attention even from babies (Samuels and Elwy 1985).   On the other 
hand, it can also be argued that unattractive students may devote themselves to studying 
because they may have difficulties in social aspects of schooling.  The net impact of 
beauty on school outcomes, therefore, could be uncertain. 
During the third wave of the survey (when the individuals are in the age range of 
18-26), they were given the adult version of the Peabody Vocabulary Test.  Table 7 
reports the results from the models where these test scores are explained by beauty and 
all other personal and family characteristics.   As can be seen, very attractive females in 
Wave III (the top panel) score 3 percentage points higher in comparison to average-
looking females, and unattractive females score 2.3 percentage points lower.  In case of 
males, very attractive ones score 3.7 percentage points higher, and unattractive ones score 
1.8 percentage points lower than average-looking males, although the latter impact is not 
significantly different from zero.   The results from the sample of all three waves (lower 
panel of Table 7) are similar:  the coefficients of being very attractive are positive and the 
ones for being unattractive are negative for both males and females, and they are all 
significant. 
These findings are consistent with prior research which shows that attractiveness 
influences achievement and even psychological well-being (Umberson and Hughes 
1987), and suggest a secondary mechanism through which beauty affects crime.  If less 
attractive students face social and educational disadvantages in high school which hinder 
their human capital accumulation, then high school beauty would have an impact on 
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current crime because it would act as a proxy for the extent and quality of human capital 
formation in high school.   For example, there is research to indicate that attractive 
children receive more attention in the classroom than do unattractive children (Clifford 
and Walster 1973), and attractiveness influences perceptions of intellectual competence 
in both adults and children (Jackson, Hunter, and Hodge 1995). 
To investigate the extent to which beauty in high school has an impact on current 
(adult) crime, we estimate models where current crime is explained by beauty in high 
school, conditioning on all other explanatory variables.   To create a beauty rating for 
high school, we averaged the ratings assigned to individuals in Waves I and II.   The 
average of the two years’ beauty ratings ranges from 1 to 5.   Of the 11,567 individuals 
with non-missing beauty ratings in Waves I and II, 5.6 % received an average rating of 
2.5, and 5.1% received an average rating of 5.   Two dummy variables are created (Very 
Attractive-High School, and Unattractive-High School) to identify these ratings, which 
are added as additional explanatory variables to model III. 
 The results, which are reported in the first panel of Table 8A for females, show 
that beauty in high school has a statistically significant effect on current criminal activity 
in the cases of damaging property, assault and non-drug crime, controlling for all other 
explanatory variables that are included in Model III.   In the bottom panel of Table 8A we 
present the results of the models for females, where in addition to the complete set of 
explanatory variables measuring personal attributes and family background 
characteristics, beauty in high school as well as current beauty are included as additional 
explanatory variables.  As explained earlier in the paper, beauty ratings that were 
assigned in high school and those that were assigned when the individuals were young 
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adults are highly correlated, although they are assigned by different interviewers 7-8 
years apart.   The lower panel of Table 8A shows that, despite the high correlation 
between high school beauty and adult beauty, inclusion of adult beauty does not impact 
the magnitude or the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of high school 
beauty.   Furthermore, adult beauty has a separate effect on adult crime in five different 
crimes.   Thus, even though beauty ratings are highly correlated between high school 
years and when the individuals are young adults, adult beauty and high school beauty 
have separate impacts on current crime for females.   
Table 8B displays the results for males.  The top panel shows that high school 
beauty has an impact on current crime only in case of selling drugs, and the bottom panel 
demonstrates that adding current beauty does not eliminate this effect.   
If high school beauty is indeed a proxy for the learning experience of the 
individual when in high school, then adding measures of high school learning 
environment would reduce the size of the coefficients of high school beauty.  Tables 9A 
and 9B report the results of the models where in addition to all explanatory variables and 
current and high school beauty measures, six additional variables are included which aim 
to capture various aspects of the students’ high school experience.  These variables are 
the grade point average of the student in high school (in Wave I), whether they were 
suspended from school, expelled from school, whether they had problems with teachers, 
whether they had problems with other students, and whether they felt part of school.   
Table 9A shows that in case of females, higher high school GPA is negatively 
correlated with current criminal activity.  Suspension in high school, and problems with 
teachers increase the likelihood of current crime.  Note that the models used in the bottom 
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panel of Table 8A and the model in Table 9A are very similar; the only difference being 
the six additional high school environment variables that are included in the latter.  
Comparison of the bottom panel of Table 8A and Table 9A shows that inclusion of these 
high school variables reduces the magnitude of the estimated high school beauty effects, 
and eliminates the statistical significance of these high school attractiveness coefficients 
in cases of assault and non-drug crime.  This suggests that the impact of high school 
beauty on current crime is due to the correlation between high school beauty and the 
variables that capture high school experience for females.   The coefficients of current 
beauty remain significant; that is, adding high school environment variables does not 
influence the impact of current beauty on current crime. 
  Table 9B demonstrates that for males, GPA, suspension, having being expelled 
and problems with teachers are significant determinants of current crime, but inclusion of 
high school environment variables to the models does not reduce the estimated 
coefficients of high school beauty in a systematic and meaningful way.  These results 
suggest that the extent of beauty in high school has an impact on human capital formation 
in high school for female students, while the same is not the case for male students.   
 
V. Conclusion 
  It has been shown that beauty commands a wage premium in the labor market 
(Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).   If crime is as a labor market activity where the 
individuals make decisions based on expected payoffs from the criminal sector and the 
legal labor market, then on the margin less attractive individuals should engage in 
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criminal activity more frequently because they face a wage penalty in the legal labor 
market. 
In this paper we use data from three waves of Add Health (a nationally 
representative data set of U.S. young adults, designed to provide information about risky 
behavior) to investigate the relationship between attractiveness and criminal activity of 
young adults, aged 18 to 26.  Beauty ratings are assigned by interviewers on a scale from 
1 to 5, and they are rather consistent between the ratings assigned by different 
interviewers in different years of the survey.     
We find evidence which indicates that very attractive females receive favorable 
treatment from the criminal justice system.  Specifically, conditional on criminal activity,  
very attractive females are less likely to be detained.  No unfavorable treatment is 
detected for unattractive individuals, or males.   Despite this effect, being very attractive 
reduces the individual’s propensity for criminal activity and being unattractive increases 
it for a number of crimes, ranging from burglary to selling drugs.   The effect of beauty 
on crime is estimated with more precision for females than for males.  It has been shown 
by prior work that unattractive females have lower labor force participation rates, and 
have husbands who have less education (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).  Thus, 
unattractive females face additional labor- and marriage-market handicaps that may 
translate into an income effect, which would reinforce the beauty-crime connection.  
Beauty could be related to socio-economic background characteristics.  However, 
our analyses demonstrate that the estimated relationship between beauty and criminal 
activity is not because beauty is acting as a proxy for socio-economic status.  This is 
because the results are insensitive to inclusion of a large number or personal and family 
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characteristics ranging from income of the family when the individual was in high school 
to family’s welfare participation; from whether the father was ever jailed to birth weight, 
to a variety of contextual variables measured at the county-level.  Furthermore, the results 
are robust to a number of tests, such as classification of beauty, measurement of beauty 
by different interviewers in different years, inclusion/exclusion of explanatory variables, 
accounting for potential interviewer effects, and inclusion of county-level contextual 
variables. 
For unattractive individuals to sort themselves into the criminal sector, they 
should face an earnings penalty in the legal labor market based on their looks.  Consistent 
with prior research, we find that being a very attractive young adult is positively 
associated with wages and being unattractive is associated with a wage penalty.   We also 
show that beauty is related to adult vocabulary test scores, which suggests the possibility 
that beauty may have an impact on human capital formation.  
Recent research has shown that a student’s height, and even a student’s name, 
which sounds like it was given by uneducated parents, influence the student’s human 
capital and skill formation during school.  Height influences participation in club 
activities (Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman 2004), and names that signal lower socio-
economic status generate lower teacher expectations (Figlio 2005).   There is also an 
extensive psychology literature which shows that people prefer to interact with 
individuals who have attractive features, and attractive children receive more attention in 
the classroom than do unattractive children (Clifford and Walster 1973).  Thus, it can be 
conjectured that looks influence human capital formation in school through the attention 
received from teachers, and interactions with other students.  This would impact the 
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learning experience of unattractive students, by adversely influencing their quantity and 
quality of schooling, although a counterbalancing argument can be made based on the 
assumption that unattractive students may devote themselves to studying as a defense 
mechanism.  
   We demonstrate that, especially for females, holding constant current beauty, 
high school beauty (pre-labor market beauty) has a separate impact on crime, and that 
high school beauty is correlated with variables that gauge various aspects of high school 
experience, such as GPA, suspension or having being expelled from school, and 
problems with teachers.  Thus, high school beauty seems to acts as a proxy for the extent 
and quality of human capital formation in high school. 
Taken together, these results suggest two handicaps faced by unattractive 
individuals.  First, a labor market penalty provides a direct incentive for unattractive 
individuals toward criminal activity.  Second, the level of beauty in high school has an 
effect on criminal propensity 7-8 years later, which seems to be due to the impact of the 
level of beauty in high school on human capital formation, although this second avenue 
seems to be effective for females only.   
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Table 1 
The Distribution of Attractiveness 
Among Young Adults (ages 18-26) in Wave III 
Category Full Sample Males Females 
1) Very unattractive 1.94% 1.37% 2.44% 
2) Unattractive 5.01% 5.22% 4.81% 
3) About average 45.87% 51.82% 40.55% 
4) Attractive 35.96% 33.66% 38.00% 
5) Very attractive 11.23% 7.92% 14.19% 
N: 15,179 7,159 8,020 
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Table 2 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Definition Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Outcome Variables    
Arrest  (N=15,071) =1 if ever been arrested or taken into custody by the police, =0 otherwise 0.110 0.313 
Convict  (N=15,152) =1 if ever been convicted of crime in a juvenile or an adult court, =0 otherwise 0.061 0.238 
Detain  (N=15,020) 
 
=1 if ever been stopped or detained by the police for questioning about the 
activities, =0 otherwise. 
0.193 
 
0.395 
 
Damage (N=15,006) =1 if deliberately damaged property that belonged to someone else in  0.087 0.282 
 the past 12 months, =0 otherwise   
Burglary (N=15,052) =1 if went into a house or building to steal something in the past 12 months,  0.019 0.135 
 =0 otherwise   
Robbery (15,049) =1 if used or threatened to use a weapon to get something from someone else  0.020 0.141 
 in the past 12 months, =0 otherwise   
Theft  (N=15,041) =1 if stole something worth more than 50 dollars in the past 12 months,  0.033 0.180 
 =0 otherwise   
Assault (N=15,150) =1 if pulled a knife on someone, shot someone, or badly hurt someone in the 0.080 0.272 
 past 12 months, =0 otherwise   
Sold Drugs (14,994) =1 if sold marijuana or other drugs in the past 12 months, =0 otherwise 0.074 0.261 
Non-drug Crime (N=15,069) =1 if committed burglary, theft, robbery, assault or damaged property into past    
 12 months, =0 otherwise 0.174 0.379 
Labor Market and Human 
Capital Outcomes    
    
Wage  (9,641) =hourly wage rate 10.646 7.008 
PPVT percentile (N=14,634) 
=Percentile ranking from the Add Health Peabody Picture Vocabulary test 
score 50.000 29.667 
Expelled from school (15,164) =1 if ever expelled from school, =0 otherwise 0.073 0.261 
    
Explanatory Variables    
Age18 a =1 if 18 years old, =0 otherwise 0.010 0.098 
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Age19 =1 if 19 years old, =0 otherwise 0.095 0.293 
Age20 =1 if 20 years old, =0 otherwise 0.132 0.339 
Age21 =1 if 21 years old, =0 otherwise 0.161 0.367 
Age22 =1 if 22 years old, =0 otherwise 0.190 0.392 
Age23 =1 if 23 years old, =0 otherwise 0.191 0.393 
Age24 =1 if 24 years old, =0 otherwise 0.161 0.368 
Age25 =1 if 25 years old, =0 otherwise 0.052 0.221 
Age26 =1 if 26 years old  =0 otherwise 0.009 0.093 
Hispanic =1 if hispanic ethnicity,=0 otherwise 0.163 0.369 
Hispanic missing =1 if ethnicity is missing, =0 otherwise 0.002 0.042 
White =1 if white, =0 otherwise 0.648 0.478 
Black =1 if Black, =0 otherwise 0.226 0.418 
Other race a =1 if other race, =0 otherwise 0.110 0.313 
Race missing =1 if race is missing, =0 otherwise 0.016 0.127 
Nonwage1 =1 if nonwage income is negative or zero dollars, =0 otherwise 0.529 0.499 
Nonwage2 =1 if nonwage income is between 0 and 5,000 dollars, =0 otherwise 0.298 0.458 
Nonwage3 =1 if nonwage income is between 5,000 and 10,000 dollars, =0 otherwise 0.051 0.220 
Nonwage4 a =1 if nonwage income is more than 10,000 dollars, =0 otherwise 0.122 0.327 
Nonwage missing =1 if nonwage income is missing, =0 otherwise 0.069 0.254 
Healthy =1 if in good or better health, =0 otherwise 0.954 0.210 
Healthy missing =1 if health is missing, =0 otherwise 0.0001 0.011 
USborn =1 if born in the U.S., =0 otherwise 0.919 0.272 
USborn missing =1 if Usborn is missing, =0 otherwise 0.0001 0.014 
Catholic =1 if religion is Catholic, =0 othwerwise 0.251 0.433 
Protestant =1 if religion is Protestant, =0 otherwise 0.398 0.489 
No Religion =1 if believes in no religion, =0 otherwise 0.202 0.401 
Other religion a =1 if believes in other religion, =0 otherwise 0.134 0.341 
Religion missing =1 if religion is missing, =0 otherwise 0.016 0.125 
Jailed Father =1 if father was ever jailed, =0 otherwise 0.137 0.344 
Jailed Father missing =1 if Jailed Father is missing, =0 otherwise 0.070 0.256 
Mother High-school – a  =1 if mother has less than high-school degree, =0 otherwise 0.144 0.351 
Mother High-school =1 if mother has high-school degree, =0 otherwise 0.316 0.465 
Mother High-school+ =1 if mother had more than high-school degree, =0 otherwise 0.436 0.496 
Mother education missing =1 if mother's education is missing, =0 otherwise 0.104 0.305 
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Parental welfare =1 if parents were receiving welfare during Wave I, =0 otherwise 0.075 0.265 
Parental welfare missing =1 if parental welfare is missing, =0 otherwise 0.141 0.348 
Biological Father =1 if biological father was present during Wave 1, =0 otherwise 0.582 0.493 
Step Father =1 if step father was present during Wave 1, =0 otherwise 0.109 0.311 
Father absent =1 if the father is absent during Wave 1, =0 otherwise 0.306 0.461 
Father information is missing a =1 if the father information is missing during Wave 1, =0 otherwise 0.003 0.057 
Mother's age at birth 1 a =1 if mother's age at birth was less than 19, =0 otherwise 0.076 0.265 
Mother's age at birth 2 =1 if mother's age at birth was between 20 and 30, =0 otherwise 0.514 0.500 
Mother's age at birth 3 =1 if mother's age at birth was between 31 and 40, =0 otherwise 0.133 0.339 
Mother's age at birth 4 =1 if mother's age at birth was 41 or more, =0 otherwise 0.006 0.079 
Mother's age at birth missing =1 if mother's age at birth was missing, =0 otherwise 0.271 0.445 
Parental Income1 a =1 if total parental income was less $10,000, =0 otherwise 0.059 0.235 
Parental Income 2 =1 if total parental income was between $10,000 and $25,000, =0 otherwise  0.159 0.366 
Parental Income 3 =1 if total parental income was between $25,000 and $75,000, =0 otherwise 0.427 0.495 
Parental Income 4 =1 if total parental income was between $75,000 and $125,000, =0 otherwise 0.091 0.287 
Parental Income 5 =1 if total parental income was more than $125,000, =0 otherwise 0.020 0.139 
Parental Income missing =1 if total parental income was missing, =0 otherwise 0.244 0.430 
Birthweight1 =1 if birth weight was less than 1,500 grams, =0 otherwise 0.018 0.134 
Birthweight2 =1 if birth weight was between 1,500 and 2,500 grams, =0 otherwise 0.074 0.262 
Birthweight3 a =1 if birth weight was more than 2,500 grams, =0 otherwise 0.725 0.447 
Birthweight missing =1 if birth weight is missing, =0 otherwise 0.183 0.386 
    
Number of observations   15,179   
a Omitted category. 
Wave I  pertains to 1994-1995, when the respondents were first surveyed while they were in high school. 
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Table 3 
The Effect of Beauty on Crime, Wave III 
     FEMALES     
  Damaging Burglary Robbery Theft Assault Non-drug Selling Drugs 
    Property          Crime   
 Very Attractive -0.013** -0.005* -0.0005 0.001 -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Unattractive -0.005 0.007 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.019 0.029*** 
I  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
 Control Variables No No No No No No No 
 Interviewer Fixed Effects No No No No No No No 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.012* -0.004 -0.0004 0.003 -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Unattractive -0.006 0.008 0.015** 0.003 0.022** 0.012 0.029*** 
II  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
 Control Variables Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal 
  Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.011* -0.005 -0.0002 0.003 -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Unattractive -0.006 0.008 0.015** 0.004 0.022** 0.012 0.030*** 
III  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
 Control Variables Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. 
  and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of Observations 7,959 7,976 7,974 7,974 8,003 7,966 7,960 
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Table 3 (concluded) 
     MALES     
  Damaging Burglary Robbery Theft Assault Non-drug Selling Drugs 
    Property         Crime    
 Very Attractive -0.006 0.001 -0.011* -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.022* 
  (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) 
 Unattractive 0.013 0.009 0.023** 0.031** 0.023 0.036* 0.017 
I  (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) 
 Control Variables No No No No No No No 
 Interviewer Fixed Effects No No No No No No No 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.002 -0.002 -0.012* -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 -0.023 
  (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) 
 Unattractive 0.011 0.001 0.023** 0.025* 0.010 0.019 0.005 
II  (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) 
 Control Variables Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal 
  Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.001 -0.001 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.021 
  (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) 
 Unattractive 0.012 0.001 0.023** 0.024* 0.005 0.017 0.004 
III  (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) 
 Control Variables Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. 
  and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
 Number of Observations 7,047 7,076 7,075 7,067 7,147 7,103 7,034 
The number of observations remain the same between Models I, II, and III for each crime.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates 
that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance 
at 1% or better.  Model I includes no control variables.  Model II includes age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, nonwage income, health status, religious 
affiliation, and whether the person was born in the U.S.    Model III contains the same explanatory variables as Model II, but it also includes 
family socio-economic background characteristics which are family income in 1994, mother’s education, whether the father was biological, step 
father, or absent, mother’s age at birth, whether father was ever jailed, whether parents were receiving welfare. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Beauty on Crime (Four-Way Classification of Beauty), Wave III 
     FEMALES     
  Damaging Burglary Robbery Theft Assault Non-drug Selling Drugs 
    Property         Crime    
 Very Attractive -0.017*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.030*** -0.043*** -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
 Attractive -0.008 -0.005** -0.001 -0.007** -0.015*** -0.025*** -0.003 
I  (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Unattractive -0.009 0.005 0.016** -0.002 0.024** 0.007 0.028*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
 Control Variables No No No No No No No 
 Interviewer Fixed Effects No No No No No No No 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.017** -0.007** -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
 Attractive -0.010* -0.005* 0.000 -0.006* -0.010* -0.019** -0.002 
II  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Unattractive -0.011 0.005 0.015** 0.0002 0.018* 0.003 0.028*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
 Control Variables Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal 
  Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.016** -0.007** 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.025*** -0.034*** -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
 Attractive -0.010* -0.005* 0.0003 -0.007* -0.009* -0.018** -0.003 
III  (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
 Unattractive -0.011 0.005 0.016** 0.0005 0.018 0.003 0.028*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
 Control Variables Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. 
  and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Number of Observations 7959 7976 7974 7974 8003 7966 7960 
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Table 4 (concluded) 
     MALES     
  Damaging Burglary Robbery Theft Assault Non-drug Selling Drugs 
    Property         Crime    
 Very Attractive -0.004 -0.001 -0.012* -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.027** 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) 
 Attractive 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.013 
I  (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) 
 Unattractive 0.015 0.007 0.022** 0.031** 0.021 0.036* 0.012 
  (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) 
 Control Variables No No No No No No No 
 Interviewer Fixed Effects No No No No No No No 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.002 -0.004 -0.012* -0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.028** 
  (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) 
 Attractive 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.012 
II  (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
 Unattractive 0.011 -0.001 0.023** 0.024* 0.007 0.017 0.000 
  (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) 
 Control Variables Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal 
  Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes Attributes 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
 Very Attractive -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.026* 
  (0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) 
 Attractive -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 
III  (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
 Unattractive 0.011 -0.001 0.022** 0.023* 0.003 0.015 -0.001 
  (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) 
 Control Variables Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. Personal Attr. 
  and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES and SES 
  Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
 Number of Observations 7047 7076 7075 7067 7147 7103 7034 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5 
The Effect of Beauty on Criminal Justice Outcomes 
 FEMALES 
 Detained Arrested Arrested Convicted Convicted 
Very Attractive -0.017* -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unattractive -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Crime 0.143***  0.043***  0.007 
 (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Detained  0.412*** 0.405***   
  (0.017) (0.017)   
Arrested    0.444*** 0.439*** 
    (0.027) (0.027) 
Control Variables Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7920 7960 7914 7974 7923 
 MALES 
 Detained Arrested Arrested Convicted Convicted 
Very Attractive 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Unattractive 0.022 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.014) 0.014 (0.012) (0.012) 
Crime 0.231***  0.028***  0.019** 
 (.014)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Detained  0.620*** 0.614***   
  (0.011) (0.011)   
Arrested    0.564*** 0.560*** 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
Control Variables Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Personal & Family 
Attributes 
Interviewer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7009 7041 6997 7076 7027 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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Table 6 
The Effect of Beauty on Crime, Waves I, II and III (Individuals with no missing beauty information)a 
  FEMALES 
  Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive -0.022*** -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.024* -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
Unattractive 0.014** 0.002 0.006* 0.001 0.025*** 0.035*** 0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
I 
Control Variables No No No No No No No 
         
Very Attractive -0.019*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.016 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
Unattractive 0.015** 0.001 0.005 0.0004 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) II 
Control Variables Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
         
Very Attractive -0.020*** -0.005* -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.015 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
Unattractive 0.014** 0.001 0.005 0.0003 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.011* 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) III 
Control Variables Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
 No. of Observations 6,091 6,103 6,098 6,099 6,126 6,100 6,090 
These models do not contain interviewer fixed effects, because being attractive and unattractive are determined by the sum of all three ratings 
assigned by different interviewers in three different waves. 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 6 (concluded) 
The Effect of Beauty on Crime, Waves I, II and III (Individuals with no missing beauty information) 
  MALES 
  Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.02 0.007 0.015 -0.045** 
 (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.039) (0.023) 
Unattractive -0.009 -0.003 0.011** 0.002 0.017* 0.007 0.017* 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) 
I 
Control Variables No No No No No No No 
         
Very Attractive 0.012 -0.0003 0.004 -0.016 0.011 0.025 -0.041* 
 (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.039) (0.023) 
Unattractive -0.007 -0.003 0.009* 0.001 0.014 0.005 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) II 
Control Variables Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
Personal 
Attributes 
         
Very Attractive 0.010 -0.002 0.003 -0.016 0.009 0.020 -0.040* 
 (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.038) (0.023) 
Unattractive -0.003 -0.003 0.010* 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.017* 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) III 
Control Variables Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
Personal & 
Family 
Attributes 
 No. of Observations 5,335 5,354 5,355 5,350 5,400 5,369 5,329 
 
These models do not contain interviewer fixed effects, because being attractive and unattractive are determined by the sum of all three ratings 
assigned by different interviewers in three different waves. 
See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 7 
The Effect of Beauty on Wages and Human Capital Indicators 
 Data set: Wave III  
 FEMALES MALES 
 Test Score  Test Score 
Very Attractive 2.999*** 3.706*** 
 (0.906) (1.163) 
Unattractive -2.330* -1.800 
 (1.210) (1.326) 
Control Variables Personal & Family Attributes  Personal & Family Attributes 
Interviewer Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes 
Number of 
observations 
7,753  6,881 
 
Data set: Waves I-III using individuals with no missing beauty information  
 FEMALES MALES 
 Test Score  Test Score 
Very Attractive 2.340* 4.694** 
 (1.292) (2.374) 
Unattractive -3.900*** -3.726*** 
 (0.850) (0.791) 
Control Variables Personal & Family Attributes  Personal & Family Attributes 
Number of 
observations 
5,954  5,209 
These models do not contain interviewer fixed effects, because being attractive and unattractive are determined by the sum of all three ratings 
assigned by different interviewers in three different waves. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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 Table 8A  
 
The Effect of Current Beauty on Crime, Conditional on High School Beauty 
 FEMALES (n: 6,091-6126) 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive_High School -0.022*** -0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) 
Unattractive_High School 0.018 -0.005 0.001 -0.008 0.026** 0.040** 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive -0.018** -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Unattractive -0.007 0.007 0.017* -0.00004 0.024* 0.010 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) 
Very Attractive_High School -0.019** -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) 
Unattractive_High School 0.018 -0.006 -0.0004 -0.008 0.023* 0.038** 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) 
These models include the complete list of personal and family background characteristics listed in Table 2, and included in models reported in 
Table 3. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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Table 8B 
 
The Effect of Current Beauty on Crime Conditional on High School Beauty 
 MALES (n: 5,335-5400) 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive_High School -0.024 -0.003 0.012 0.002 -0.023 -0.017 -0.054** 
 (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025) 
Unattractive_High Sschool 0.012 -0.009 0.007 0.00008 0.009 0.005 -0.023 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) 
 
 
 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive -0.003 0.0005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) 
Unattractive 0.004 0.0004 0.021* 0.026* 0.011 0.017 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) 
Very Attractive_High School -0.024 -0.003 0.013 0.003 -0.023 -0.017 -0.053** 
 (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025) 
Unattractive_High School 0.012 -0.009 0.004 -0.003 0.008 0.003 -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) 
These models include the complete list of personal and family background characteristics, listed in Table 2, and included in models reported in Table 3. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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Table 9A  
The Effect of Current Beauty on Crime Conditional on High School Beauty and Experience 
 FEMALES (n: 6,091-6126) 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive -0.016** -0.005 0.002 -0.0004 -0.017*** -0.029*** -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Unattractive -0.007 0.007 0.017* -0.001 0.016 0.001 0.035*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) 
Very Attractive_High School -0.017** -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) 
Unattractive_High School 0.015 -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 0.014 0.024 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) 
GPA -0.007* 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.011*** -0.014** -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Suspension 0.019** 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.040*** 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
Expelled 0.061*** 0.024* 0.021 0.018 0.050** 0.102*** 0.058*** 
 (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) 
Problems with teachers 0.011** 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.025*** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Problems with other students 0.007 -0.00007 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Felt part of school 0.007 0.007** -0.0003 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
These models include the complete list of personal and family background characteristics, listed in Table 2, and included in models reported in Table 3. 
The models are identical to those reported in the bottom panel of Table 8A, with the difference of the six high school variables listed in the table. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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Table 9B 
The Effect of Current Beauty on Crime Conditional on High School Beauty and Experience 
 MALES (n: 5,335-5400) 
 
 
Damaging 
Property Burglary Robbery Theft  Assault 
Non-drug 
Crime Selling Drugs 
Very Attractive -0.007 0.001 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004 -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) 
Unattractive 0.008 0.004 0.021 0.030* 0.013 0.028 -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) 
Very Attractive_HS -0.021 -0.002 0.015 0.005 -0.016 -0.008 -0.046* 
 (0.030) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.039) (0.026) 
Unattractive_HS 0.013 -0.012 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.033** 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.016) 
GPA 0.015** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.012** -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Suspension -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.053*** 0.035** 0.038*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
Expelled 0.044** 0.019* 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.110*** 0.136*** 0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) 
Problems with teachers 0.068*** 0.013** 0.006 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.083*** 0.057*** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
Problems with other students 0.016 0.008 0.007 -0.013* -0.012 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
Felt part of school 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.018* 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
These models include the complete list of personal and family background characteristics, listed in Table 2, and included in models reported in 
Table 3. 
The models are identical to those reported in the bottom panel of Table 8A, with the difference of the six high school variables listed in the table. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A * indicates that the estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 10% level, ** 
indicates significance at 5%, and *** stands for significance at 1% or better. 
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